Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems in practice are greatly vulnerable to spoofing attacks. The latest voice conversion technologies are able to produce perceptually natural sounding speech that mimics any target speakers. However, the perceptual closeness to a speaker's identity may not be enough to deceive an ASV system. In this work, we propose a framework that uses the output scores of an ASV system as the feedback to a voice conversion system. The attack framework is a black-box adversary that steals ones voice identity, because it requires no knowledge about the ASV system but the system outputs. The target speakers are chosen from CMU-ARCTIC database, while another 282 speakers from the Wall Street Journal corpus are used as the source speakers to perform the studies. It is found that the proposed feedback-controlled voice conversion framework produces adversarial samples that are more deceptive than straightforward voice conversion, thereby boosting the impostor scores in ASV experiments. Further, the perceptual evaluation studies reveal that converted speech thus obtained do not deteriorate significantly from baseline voice conversion system.
INTRODUCTION
Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) systems have enabled many real-world applications [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Such systems for are facing increasing threats from spoofing attacks for unauthorized access [6, 7] . In general, such spoofing attacks are grouped under four major categories, namely, impersonation, replay, Voice Conversion (VC) and Text-To-Speech (TTS) synthesis [8] . To safeguard the ASV systems from spoofing attacks, anti-spoofing countermeasures have become critically important [8, 9] . In this paper, we study a machine learning adversary, the black-box attack on ASV systems.
From the the attackers' point of view, the most effective way to perform attack is within the ASV system [8] . However, it generally requires system level access, which is not This paper is submitted to ICASSP 2020. easily possible in practice. Alternatively, the spoofing attacks can performed at the input signal level by TTS or VC. The current TTS and VC systems are generally developed with the objective of improving the perceptual quality and similarity, which makes the generated speech to sound closer to the target [10, 11] . However, perceptual similarity may not be enough to deceive ASV systems as they don't perceive in the same way as humans [12] .
The black-box attacks represent an advance level of spoofing attack using synthetic speech [13] [14] [15] . In such attacks, the attacker do not require the knowledge of either internal functionality of a system or training data. The attacker rather needs to observe the output of black-box for a given input [14] . The strategy of black-box attacks deals with training a substitute model using machine learning techniques to evade the target system by considering the outputs of black-box. Such attacks were evaluated on computer vision tasks [14] . We believe they have become the spoofing adversary to ASV systems.
Recent studies [16, 17] show that ASV system can be exploited to perform assist voice mimicry attacks. The results however showed that even there exists a similarity between voice of an attacker and the target speaker, mimicks still can not attack the ASV system successfully. It is also found from their studies that untrained impersonators do not show a high threat to an ASV system, but the use of an ASV system to attack another ASV system is a potential threat. To bring the previous studies a step forward, we consider training a voice conversion system as the black-box adversary to attack the ASV systems.
In this work, we consider a VC system with Phonetic PosterioGram (PPG) as a baseline for performing attacks to an ASV system. We assume that we don't have any system level access to the ASV system but the ASV output scores. We can then train a substitute network that consists of a VC system with feedback from the output score of the black-box ASV system. The objective function of this substitute network is modified to have a joint cost based on the VC and the black-box ASV output. Such feedback-controlled VC can steal one's voice identity by simply observing the output scores of the ASV system.
The studies in this work are carried on standard databases for VC. We have chosen the target speakers from CMU-ARCTIC corpus, whereas the source speakers are considered from Wall Street Journal (WSJ) database that consists of a sizeable population. To best of our knowledge black-box attacks on ASV systems through feedback-controlled VC have not been investigated earlier. This novel framework of performing black-box attacks on ASV highlights the novelty of the current work. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the PPG-based VC framework, which is used as a baseline in the experiments. Section 3 details the proposed black-box attack on ASV with feedback-controlled VC. Section 4 describe the experiment related settings. In Section 5 the results and analysis of the conducted studies are reported. Finally, the work is concluded in Section 6.
PPG-BASED VOICE CONVERSION FRAMEWORK
The VC methods aim to modify the source speaker's voice to sound like that of the target speaker without changing the linguistic content. Such techniques can be used to generate the voice of any target speakers to attack ASV systems. Generally, a conversion function is trained with parallel data from source and target speakers. The successful techniques include Gaussian mixture model (GMM) [18] [19] [20] , frequency warping [21] [22] [23] [24] , exemplar based methods [25] [26] [27] and neural network methods [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . Recently, various techniques also have been proposed to achieve non-parallel data VC [33] [34] [35] . Among non-parallel data attempts, one of the successful approaches is PPG-based VC [36] [37] [38] , which models the relationship between the PPG features, that is called the linguistic feature, to the acoustic feature. As the PPG feature is considered to be speaker independent, the source speaker information is not required in the training process. Hence, PPG-based VC technique is suitable for many to one conversion, which relates to the attack scenario, where an unknown attacker pretends to be the target speaker using converted voice.
PPG-based VC
PPG-based VC framework consists of two stages: offline training and run-time conversion. We will explain the details next.
During offline training, PPG and aocustic features are first extracted from the target speaker, denoted as
N denotes the number of feature frame. As X and Y are extracted from the same utterance, these two feature sequence are initially aligned. Then, the feature mapping of the target speaker is trained by a conversion network with a criterion of minimizing the mean squared error (MSE) between target and predicted features. Given a predicted acoustic feature sequence denoted as Y = [ y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y N ], the MSE can be computed by
At run-time, the trained conversion model is used to generate the converted acoustic features for given PPGs from any source speaker. Then a Vocoder is used to reconstruct the speech signal from acoustic features.
Limitation for ASV Attacks
The VC performance is typically evaluated in terms of perceptual quality and similarity by human listeners [36] [37] [38] . However, perceptual results may not always correlate with having an enhanced ASV scores as far as spoofing attack is concerned. Such observations have been reported in previous works [12, 16] . From the attackers' point of view, a joint objective function that includes the ASV scores as the feedback will directly optimize the VC outputs to become more deceptive to the system.
BLACK-BOX ATTACKS ON ASV USING FEEDBACK-CONTROLLED VC
This section discusses the proposed framework of performing black-box attacks on ASV using feedback-controlled VC. The ASV system acts as black-box that provides feedback to the VC system to have the desired output. We next detail the framework in the following subsections.
Black-box ASV
The progress in the field of ASV research has witnessed major breakthrough in the recent years. It has evolved a lot from classical GMMs to factor analysis and deep learning models [1, 39, 40] . In this work, we have considered i-vector speaker modeling as a black-box ASV system for performing the studies [39] . Although very recent systems like xvectors have gained attention in the community [40] , the ivector based system is still popular in the community due to its effectiveness under controlled conditions. An i-vector is a compact representation that projects the GMM mean supervector of an utterance to a lower dimensional space that contains the dominant speaker characteristics. We call the ASV system as a black-box because the attacker doesn't have any access to internal algorithms, but the system output scores.
Feedback-controlled VC
The objective of the feedback-controlled VC is to adjust the converted voice to be more deceptive for the ASV black-box. It is assumed that the attacker has the knowledge of the ASV output score for each input trial. However, the attacker does not need to have the understating of the ASV system. 1 shows the training process of the proposed feedbackcontrolled VC system. Two types of losses are used to update the conversion model by minibatch stochastic gradient descent. For each minibatch, the predicted acoustic features, Y, is first obtained with given input PPGs, X, as described in Section 2.1. The MSE loss of VC, Loss V C , can be calculated by Eq. (1). Simultaneously, we generate the converted speech with Y. An ASV score, denoting the similarity between i-vectors of converted and target speech, is obtained by feeding the converted speech to the black-box ASV system. The Loss SV is calculated by normalizing it between [0, 1], followed by its transformation in the negative scale as another loss. Then the two parts of losses are combined with weighted sum for the conversion network updating. The combined loss is defined as
where, α denotes the weighted ratio.
EXPERIMENTS
This section describes the details of the database considered for the study and the experimental setup. Next, we discuss each of them.
Database
The experiments are conducted on the (WSJ) corpus [41] and CMU-ARCTIC database [42] . We now describe how the corpora are used for VC and ASV framework for the studies.
Data description for VC
For VC system training, two speakers form CMU-ARCTIC database are selected as target speakers, including one male speaker jmk, and one female speaker slt. 1,000 utterances from each speaker are used for training, where the size of training and validation sets are fixed as 800 and 200 utterances, respectively. The 42-dimensional PPG features are extracted by the PPG extractor trained on the WSJ corpus [41] . The detailed information for PPG extractor training can be found in [37] . The 80-dimensional Mel-filterbank features are extracted from 513-dimensional log spectrogram as the acoustic output. The Griffin-Lim vocoder [43] is used for speech signal reconstruction. All the audio files are resampled at 16 kHz.
Data description for ASV attack
For the ASV attack experiment, 282 speakers from WSJ database are selected, which consist of 141 male and 141 female, with 10 utterances from each speaker. These speakers form the imposter set for the studies totalling 2,820 non-target trials against each target speaker. The same 2,820 utterances are first used as source speech converting by trained PPG-VC system, then considered for performing black-box attacks to the ASV system. In addition, we consider 1,132 genuine trials from the each of the two target speakers to get a reference for the trend from genuine scores.
Experimental Setup
We conduct a contrastive study between two VC systems with and without ASV feedback.
• PPG-VC: This refers to the PPG-based VC system without ASV feedback [36] . The network contains two Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BLSTM) layers with 512 hidden units of each layer. The network input is PPG features (42-dim); while the dimension of output is 240, consisting of the mel-filterbank (80-dim) with its dynamic and accelerate features.
• PPG-VC-FC: This refers to the proposed feedbackcontrolled VC. We use the same network setting as that of PPG-VC system. The network is updated with the combined loss from both VC and ASV systems. Empirically, the weighted ratio α is set to 0.7.
For all the model training, the minibatch size is set to 10, while the momentum and learning rate are set as 0.9 and 0.002, respectively.
We have used i-vector based system for ASV studies [39] . The attacker uses this system as a black-box to feed the output score to the proposed feedback-controlled VC. The standard Kaldi 1 implementation of i-vector is used in this work. This system uses mel frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC) as acoustic features. The i-vector extractor of the system has 400 speaker factors that represents the utterances of every speaker in terms of 400-dimensional fixed vector by factor analysis approach. In this work, we used cosine distance between the train and the test i-vector to generate the ASV output for authentication of a trial.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we report the results for the black-box attacks performed on the ASV system. Apart from the studies with the attacks, we also consider some perceptual study to compare the generated speech using feedback-controlled VC system to that without feedback. We discuss the details of these studies in the following subsections.
ASV Studies with Black-box Attacks
The conventional ASV system studies include genuine and imposter trials to evaluate performance. In this work, apart from these two trial categories, we consider the attacks made through baseline PPG-VC and our proposed PPG-VC-FC systems. We note that the trials for the attacks are derived from the same set of examples that are considered as imposter trials. In general, the ASV studies consider measures like equal error rate or detection cost function to benchmark the results. However, in the current studies, we perform attacks only against two speakers that include one female and one male speaker to validate our idea. Thus, the proportion of number of target and non-target trials associated is very small that makes such measures not be appropriate to report the studies. Therefore, we focus on the scores obtained from the different trial categories, rather than some performance measure to observe their distributions to draw some findings. Fig. 2 (a) shows the different score distributions for a female target speaker (slt) chosen for this study. We observe that the genuine and imposter scores generated from the ASV system are well separable that suggests its effectiveness for verifying a claimed identity. It is found that the scores obtained from the examples generated using PPG-VC system can yield scores close to the genuine scores of the target. In addition, we find that the scores obtained from the trials generated with our proposed PPG-VC-FC further enhances the scores. The results clearly show that PPG-VC-FC heightens the security threat to the ASV system. Further, we observe the effect on intra-gender and inter-gender conversion with the proposed system in Fig. 2 (b) and Fig. 2 (c) , respectively. It is noticed that intra-gender conversion scores are more close towards the genuine than those from inter-gender conversion.
We then consider the studies on a male target speaker (jmk). Similar to previous study with the female target speaker, the score distributions of overall ASV system, intragender conversion and inter-gender conversion are illustrated in Fig. 3 . The scores obtained from the black-box attacks move more towards the distribution of genuine trials. In addition, we find similar trend for score distributions of intragender and inter-gender conversion with that observed in case female target speaker. To quantitatively assess the shift of scores from PPG-VC to PPG-VC-FC, we report the area of shift, that is the percentage of shifted area over the original area, between the two distributions. The area of shift provides insights on their similarity, which also indicates the shift of samples from one distribution to the other. Table 1 shows the overall, intra-gender and inter-gender area of score shifts for the both male and female target. It is observed that the shift in female speaker is higher than that in male speaker. We achieve overall score shift of 7.40% and 4.62% for female and male speaker, respectively. This confirms the effectiveness of PPG-VC-FC black-box attacks. In addition, the inter-gender conversion is found to benefited more than the intra-gender conversion for both male and female speakers.
In summary, we observe that the PPG-VC-FC system effectively shifts the ASV output scores towards those of the target speakers. While the experiments in this paper are conducted on the back-box ASV system, it is worth studying how the same feedback-controlled mechanism interacts with antispoofing countermeasures as well. 
Perceptual Evaluation
The studies conducted to perform black-box attacks on ASV using feedback-controlled VC and its positive results made us curious to perform some perceptual evaluation study on such attacks. This may provide some insights to link human behaviour against machines for treating such conventional VC attacks and our proposed black-box attacks. AB preference tests are conducted to assess the speech quality. During tests, each paired samples A and B are randomly selected from the proposed PPG-VC-FC and baseline PPG-VC, respectively. Each listener is asked to choose the sample with better quality or no preference. For each test, 20 sample pairs are randomly selected from the 2,820 paired samples. We note that 10 subjects participated in this study. Fig. 4 presents the results of quality preference tests with 95% confidence. It is observed that the identification rates of PPG-VC and PPG-VC-FC fall into each others confidence intervals. This indicates that they are not significantly different in terms of speaker identity. In addition, most of the listeners could not differentiate between the two. It shows that the feedback-controlled VC is able to attack the ASV system without degrading the speech quality.
We then perform another study referred to as XAB preference study for perceptual speaker similarity evaluation. In XAB preference test, X indicates the reference target sample, A and B are the converted samples randomly selected from PPG-VC-FC and PPG-VC, respectively. The listeners are asked to listen to the samples and then decide which one between A and B is closer to the reference sample or no preference. For each test, 20 sample pairs are randomly selected from the 2,820 paired samples. The same 10 subjects of the previous test are invited for this study. Fig. 5 presents the results of similarity preference tests to a target speaker with 95% confidence. We find that the trend is similar to that observed in the previous speech quality study. Again, the majority of subjects have chosen the 'No preference' option, and no significant difference is observed between PPG-VC and PPG-VC-FC in terms of speaker similarity.
The studies in this work showcase that the black-box attacks on ASV can be a possible way to perform attacks for stealing one's identity. We also find from the perceptual evaluation study that examples generated from our proposed black-box attack through feedback-controlled VC can keep the speech quality intact while performing the attacks. The future work will focus on to investigate such black-box attacks for a larger population and different application scenario, where API of ASV system is not available to the attacker.
CONCLUSIONS
This work devotes to perform black-box attacks on ASV systems with a feedback-controlled VC system. Although the vulnerability traditional spoofing attacks to ASV has been established, the black-box attacks to machine learning poise a greater threat. In this work, we consider using ASV system as a black-box to use the output as an adversary to the conventional VC system. The objective function of learning the VC system is modified considering the output of black-box ASV. The studies conducted on CMU-ARCTIC and WSJ corpora indicate that the proposed feedback-controlled VC system is able to enhance the ASV scores of the converted speech that makes it more deceptive towards authentication against the target speakers. Moreover, according to the subjective test results, we find that feedback-controlled VC maintains the system performance in terms of speech quality and speaker similarity for the generated speech.
